STATE-CENTRED SECURITY FRAMEWORKS AND MARITIME SECURITY STAKEHOLDERS' ENGAGEMENT IN SECURING THE GULF OF GUINEA

Abstract

This study examines the shifting dynamics of maritime insecurity and security counter- responses in the Gulf of Guinea. During the last twenty years, maritime insecurity has shifted from sporadic incidents of sea robbery to sophisticated crimes like piracy, oil bunkering, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, cybercrime, and offshore sabotage. These trends are supported by deeper socio- economic and political vulnerabilities, particularly at the coastal states like Nigeria. As much as regional and international institutions like the Yaounde Code of Conduct and multilateral maritime cooperation, have been established, current security responses remain predominantly state- focused, uneven, and often disconnected from local realities. Based on the Evolving Maritime Insecurity Governance Theory (EMIGT), this study critically discusses how the existing governance structures adapt to counter- mounting threats, and to what extent they reflect inclusivity, responsiveness, and sustainability. EMIGT offers a theoretical framework that maritime insecurity is of dynamic and multifaceted character, and so it requires adaptive, people- centred, and multi- actor approaches to governance. The study employs documented sources in determining the effectiveness of current responses and advocates a transformative framework of maritime security administration which addresses both urgent threats and the structural drivers of insecurity within the Gulf of Guinea.