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Multimodal Discourse Analysis of Ideology in Selected Media Releases on *Boko Haram* (2012-2019)

Abstract

This study identified ideologies and interpreted their linguistic and visual representations in the media releases of *Boko Haram*. It also examined the communicative modalities in the media releases and related them to   ideology, power, and dominance in the discourse. The data for the study were drawn from purposively selected 10 video recordings of media releases of *Boko Haram*.The media release video clips were downloaded from the YouTube through Internet ethnography. The speeches in the selected video clips were later transcribed into written texts, while four screenshots of relevant visuals were taken from the video clips. The verbal mode was subjected to the analytical tools of Halliday's Systemic Functional Grammar, and the visual mode was analysed using the principles of Kress and van Leeuwen's Visual Grammar. The results showed that *Boko Haram* espoused ideologies of state religion, divine power, *Salafi-Jihadism*, and anti-Westernisation using verbal and visual resources. The study further discovered that the ideological issues in the media releases were conveyed through transitivitypatterns (mainly material, verbal, behavioural, mental and relational processes), and information structure, while the visual meanings conveyed   by means of body posture, colour, dressing, images and symbols. Lastly, the results showed that the ideological issues espoused in the discourse were reflective of Nigeria's socio-political contexts. The study concluded that the media releases of *Boko Haram* exemplify the expressions of power and dominance through verbal and visual semiotic referents.

In the present age of digital technologies, there is a gradual departure from the linguo-centric dominance of written language to the recognition and combination of other modes of communication with written language (verbal modes). Siefkes (2015) and van Leeuwen (2017) reveal that other modes of communication such as gestures, images, graphics, typography, sound, colour and other non-verbal modes which have over the centuries been marginalised now feature prominently in human communication: writing (print), audio, and video. The combination of these several modes in a communicative event is what is called multimodality or multimodal communication.

Multimodality is the confluence of discourse and technology (Cheng and Liu, 2014) owing to the manner in which the conventional 'mono-modal' (Kress, 2010, p. 27) text form of writing and speech has given way to multiple modes of communication due to the

influence of technology; and this has made it possible for modern communication to be an ensemble of modes in which there is modal division of labour, meaning that different modes come together to play different but complementary roles in communication (Kress, 2010). Kress and Van Leeuwen (1996) believe that visual modes are functionally not different from the verbal mode and they can simultaneously realise the three communicative metafunctions of ideational, interpersonal and textual as the verbal mode does.

The current study deployed the framework of Multimodal Discourse Analysis (MDA) to examine *Boko Haram's* ideologies in selected media releases of the sect between 2012 and 2019. *Boko Haram* otherwise known as *Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* (the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Traditions and Jihad) had been up in arms with the Nigerian state since 2009, unleashing several attacks on the nation, especially the North-East. The group has claimed responsibility for carrying out several attacks on government institutions, civilians, public places and military formations. The numerous attacks have claimed many lives and displaced many locals.

Apart from repeated attacks on the Nigerian state, one remarkable means by which *Boko Haram* has been executing and sustaining its agenda is through its media releases. The media releases form discourse narratives in which the public are confronted with sundry information (one of which is the ideology of the sect) which are conveyed through multimodal resources. These media releases (mainly videos), as multimodal texts, are replete with linguistic and visual resources that convey the ideological stances of the sect. The motivation for this study, therefore, is to account for how language and other semiotic resources have been instrumental in projecting *Boko Haram's* ideologies in theconflict between it and the Nigerian state. The aim of this study is to examine the communicative modalities in the media releases of *Boko Haram* in the conflict between it and the Federal Government of Nigeria between 2012 and 2019 with a view to uncovering the expressions of ideology, power and dominance in the discourse. In other words, this study seeks to specifically see through the prism of the theoretical and analytical frameworks of MDA, the ideologies raised in the texts, and analyse and interpret the linguistic and visual discursive elements of ideology in the selected media releases, respectively. The study is equally interested in putting the issue in focus within the socio-political contexts of the Nigerian state.

2.0   Statement of Research Problem

Several scholars in the field of linguistics have studied *Boko Haram* discourse. Some of the earlier studies such as Agbedo (2012), Olagunju and Ajadi (2014), Ayoola and Olaosun (2014) and Ogungbemi (2016) used the approach of Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the linguistic component of media representation of *Boko Haram*, while they took for granted the discourse significance of other semiotic modes of communication in the discourse. Adeyemo (2022) examined visual representations of *Boko Haram's* identity using Visual Grammar. However, attention has not been given to the study of multimodal discourse of *Boko Haram*'s representations. Using the analytical framework of Multimodal Discourse Analysis (MDA) in studying the media releases of *Boko Haram* will bring to light how *Boko Haram* put linguistic and visual modes in expressing its ideologies. This is the gap that this study intends to fill.

3.0   Ideology in Discourse

Ideology finds expression in discourse. The term ideology, according to Kathleen (2006), made its first appearance in 1787 at the time of the French Revolution, in the work of Antoine

Destutt de Tracy. Kathleen (2006) defines ideology as "the way a system - a single individual or even a whole society - rationalizes itself." van Dijk (2003, p. 6) also defines ideology as "a set of beliefs or attitudes shared by members of a particular group". These definitions underscore key characteristics of ideologies: they are idiosyncratic, and coherent; they may be delusive and impractical; they may also be temporarily stable. They also have the characteristic of differentiation between alternative principles; hence, they are not socio-cultural knowledge and are not to be presupposed to be accepted by everyone (van Dijk, 2004)

There is no ideology-free discourse among social groups; therefore, most discourses by social groups reflect their ideologies (Bloor & Bloor, 2007). Ideology is closely associated with expression of power, and that is why Ayoola and Olaosun (2014, p. 52) describes it as a "group's driving force towards the reproduction of its power and the challenge of the power of its opponents or antagonists". In every society therefore, the different social and political groups are constantly in ideological wars concerned with exercising power and dominance (Kathleen 2006).

Van Dijk (2004) explains the relationship between ideologies and memory. He argues that ideologies are not personal, just as we cannot talk about individual languages; they are therefore social properties. As a result, they form the Semantic or Social Memory, a part of the Long-Term Memory. Social Memory, as part of social cognition, is what social groups explore during discourse to counter the dominant ideology that controls a society at a point in time, with a view to displacing it and gaining control (van Dijk, 2004).

van Dijk (2004) further observes that ideologies are organized by a general schema. The schema, according to him, consists of the basic categories that organize the self and other representations of a group and its members. These categories include: membership devices (who belong to us?); typical acts (what do we do?); aims (why do we do it?), relation with other (opponent) groups; resources, including access to public discourse. These schemas control the thought patterns of a group in the way they see others and construct their discourse.

According to Chiluwa (2011, p. 10), language use in any discourse often reflects power structure in the society; therefore, "the structures of the vocabulary and grammatical patterns …often demonstrate ideology and relations of power within the culture in which the language is used". Ideology underlies the discourse of the on-going conflict between *Boko Haram* on one hand and the federal government on the other hand linguistically and visually, and they (the ideologies) will be unveiled trough the deployment of linguistic and visual tools, respectively.

3 1   Methodology

The data for this study comprises selected 10 video clips of media releases by *Boko Haram* between 2012 and 2019. The media releases were sourced on the Internet through Internet ethnography as posted by various state owned and independent media like Channels Television, Television Continental (TVC) and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). Others are Sahara TV, Agence France Press (AFP), Al-Jazeera. The data were categorised into verbal and visual. The verbal component was manually transcribed into written texts. There were 15 verbal excerpts. The visual components of the data were purposively screenshots from the video recordings of the media releases. Four (4) visuals were purposively selected – one visual was selected for the analysis of each discourse practice. The verbal component was subjected to the analytical tools of the Systemic Functional Grammar,

while the visual component was analysed using the analytical tools of Kress & van Leeuwen's Visual Grammar.

4.0   Analysis of Data
4.1   Analysis of Ideology and Its Linguistic Indicators

The analyses focus on highlighting the various ideologies represented in the media releases by *Boko Haram*, and point out the linguistic indicators realising those ideologies. The ideologies are related to the socio-political contexts of Nigeria.

4.1.1 State Religion

Boko Haram presents itself as being motivated by the ideology of state religion to take up arms against the Nigerian state, as reflected in the following extracts:

1

*We **have** indeed **establishedan Islamic caliphate***. To everyone living in Islamic caliphate, we convey our greetings. We acknowledge the brethren in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Shishan, Yemen, Somalia and the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria.Published by SplashnaijaNGon November 10, 2014

2

*We **are running** our caliphate, **our Islamic caliphate**. We **follow** the Quran. We now **practise** the injunctions of the **Quran** in the land of **Allah***.

Published by splashnaijaNG on October 2, 2014

3

*Our second message is to attack **anyone who pledges to Nigeria**, his country, to be faithful, loyal and honest and serve Nigeria. **Anyone who is interested in protecting the interest of Nigeria** is our target. The **one whose creed is to develop western education where infidels are trained** is our enemy.* **Anyone who stands on any creed other than that of our Prophet Mohammad brought to us**; the one that his great disciples followed, should know that he is our avowed enemy and if he confronts us, we will fight him.

Published by Breaking News on February 8, 2018

State religion is expressed with the following material processes highlighted in texts 1-2 in the following table:

Actor	Material Process	Goal	Circumstance
We	Have indeed established	an Islamic caliphate	
We	are running	our caliphate	
We	now practice	the injunctions of the Qur'an	in the land of Allah

In the highlighted material processes, the establishment, running and practicing of a caliphate by the sect reflects the ideology that is driving *Boko Haram*. Shekau uses the inclusive 1st person plural pronoun ''We''as the actor to assert *Boko Haram* as doer of the actions expressed by the verbal groups in the clauses. the verbal groups: ''have established'', ''are

running'', ''follow'', and ''practice'' are all associated terms in the operation of a system of government, but in this case, caliphate. The caliphates are perhaps the smaller versions of the bigger picture of having Nigeria as a caliphate. All these linguistic indicators therefore imply that *Boko Haram* is being propelled by the ideology of establishing an Islamic state in line with the Islamic moral and legal injunctions, against the secular practice in Nigeria.

Furthermore, in a set of relational processes in text 3, *Boko Haram* reveals that it is averse to secularism. In the three relational processes, Shekau identifies three categories of people who are the target of *Boko Haram* through rank shifted relative clauses that function as the qualifiers of the nominal head of the noun groups in which they are found. The sect depicts anyone who is submits their loyalty to Nigeria as an enemy. So, *Boko Haram* is saying that it hates democracy, its practice and Western education in Nigeria.

A caliphate is a unified federal Islamic government ruled by a caliph, who is the head of state. In a caliphate, there is strict adherence to the injunctions of the Qur'ān. The ideological proposition of state religion by *Boko Haram* may find expression in the North's ethno-religious sentiments that the Nigerian state is an obstacle to the spread of Islamic ideals/civilisation, and that the global message of Islam may not be widely propagated in Nigeria unless the political system imposed on the country by the colonialists is removed. Possibly in the estimation of the sect, the existing Islamic groups in the country have become pro-establishment and docile as to represent the true voice of Islam that will ensure that Nigeria joins the league of Islamic nations where Islamic ideals are practised without let. *Boko Haram* not onlysees itself as challenging the dominant ideology, but also instituting Islam as state religion.

4.1.2 Divine Power
Boko Haram attributes the source of its military successes in the fight to God. This is evident in the following extracts:
4
We have **recovered** several arms from the Damboa military base attack including armoured tanks and Kalashnikov rifles. *Look at what **Godhas given** us free of charge*; we **filled our vans with ammunition like sand**. This is what is called religion and worship.
            Published by SaharaTV on July 13, 2014
5
*God **has given** us victories of recent and we **give** thanks to Him*. We were the ones that detonated bomb in Abuja, that filthy city; we were responsible for bomb in Kano, in Plateau. We were the ones that sent a female bomber to the refinery in Lagos but Adams Oshiomole the Governor of Edo State said that it was a fire disaster. Yahaya Jurigir, the leader of Izala we will deal with you; you servant of democracy.
            Published by SaharaTV Posted on July 13 2014
6
We came to the city of Maiduguri and soldiers saw us and fled. They have lied once again to the world that they killed us. That is not true; nothing happened to our fighters. *We went there and **Godhelped us to chasethe infidels**. It is not our doing but God's*.
                                                                                            Publi
shed by SaharaTV on September 3, 2017
7
This **is not** our wisdom or power; ***it is the support of Allah***.
            Published by SaharaTV on September 3, 2017

Certain linguistic indicators testify to the representation of this ideology in texts 4-7. Across the extracts, Shekau gives agency to God as the One fighting the JTF/Nigeria. In each of the processes above, God is the actor doing something, while *Boko Haram* (represented by the objective third person plural pronoun "us") is the beneficiary of God's benevolence. The only instance with goal without a beneficiary/recipient in the material process has "the infidels" (text 6), which represents the JTF, as the bearer of the attacks of God. According to the sect, God's power brought several victories to it. In text 4 for instance, looted "several arms"(such as armoured tanks and Kalashnikov rifles) and "ammunition like sand" from the military. The same power of God made it possible for the sect to detonatea bomb in Abuja (text 5) and soldiers had to flee from the sect in Maiduguri (text 6). Shekau equates everything the sect has done with God by means of the copula verb "is" in the last sentence in Text 7. With these linguistic indicators, the sect is saying it is of God, and that is why, as a small group, it has remained invincible for the JTF.

4.1.3 *Salafi-Jihadism*
The extracts below contain linguistic proofs of Salafi-Jihadism ideology.
8
Here we are in the land called Nigeria; **but we don't see it as Nigeria**. May God's wrath befall the name Nigeria; all we know is the land of God. *We* **are doing** *the religion of God and* **no one will stop us** *from practicing the religion of Allah,* even if it is going to be only for a few people of millions of people.
        Published by SaharaTV on July 13 2014
9
Just like one of the leaders of the *unbelievers*, who is like an ape, was recently boasting that they have formed a Joint Task Force with Cameroonian forces to fight us, that they should not only send us out of Sambisa forest but also in all parts of Nigeria. So *we too* **have declared** *that we* **do not want to see** *any Nigerian in Cameroon, in Chad, in Nigeria, and even in Benin Republic*. So I call on all our brethren in Abuja, in Lagos, in Benin, in Kaduna, *wherever you find any Nigerian* **make sure** *you* **shoot** *him dead if he is deliberately against us*; but if he is ignorant of our ways, teach him on how to understand our ways. This is our first message. This is the message I have for you all.
        Published by Breaking News on February 8, 2018
10
Salafis **are** *unbelievers. Tijani Tariqah* **are** *disbelievers. Qadiriya (Tariqah)* **are** *disbelievers.* Qashabandis (He means Naqshbandis) **are** disbelievers. Shaziliyya (Tarriqah) **are** disbelievers. Mu'tazila are disbelievers. Democracy are disbelievers. Even Saudi Arabia **are** not Islamic. They are Saloul (People of Abdullah bin Obayy Al Saloul). They are not followers of the Nabi. Ka'bah is the house of Allah, the Masjid Al-Nabawwi is home. With Allah's permission, we will go and perform Hajj. Since you've changed the religion of Allah, you must enter the hell fire. Oh Saudi, what! We follow the Qur'an. We **are** people of Sunnah.
Published by SaharaTV on December 1, 2015
11
Don't you know that the over 200 Chibok school girls **have converted** *to Islam*? *They* **have now memorised** *two chapters of the Koran*. They have seen themselves in the Books of Luke and John that Christians have corrupted the Bible. *Girls from Chibok [are] confessing that Islam is the true religion.*
Published by SplashnaijaNG on November 1, 2014

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In text 8, Shekau denounces the existence of Nigeria: "Here we are in the land called Nigeria (Given), but we don't see it as Nigeria (New). In the given information, Shekau admits that there is a land called Nigeria, but in the new information, he does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the sovereignty of Nigeria in line with his *Salafi-Jihadist* creed which considers democracy as illegitimate. He even uses the third person inanimate pronoun "it"to refer to the country, rather than the third person affectionate feminine pronoun "her". In the same text, Shekau, uses behavioural processes (defiant behaviour, though), makes a categorical declaration that the sect is determined in its religious creed. The nominal group, "the religion of God" that realises the target of the process connotes totalism, fundamentalism and absolutism (Abubakar, 2016) in the *Salafi-Jihadists'* creed. Furthermore, in the second clause, the nil behaver ("no one"), indicates the sect's strong resolve resist any opposition to it.

In text 9, the verbal groups "do not want to see" and "shoot" reflect *Salafi-Jihadism*. The negative mental process, "do not want to see" connotes *Salafi-Jihadi* separatists' creed, while the violent material process verbal group "shoot" indicates the sect's violent approach to attaining its objectives under the guise of religion. In text 10, the *Salafi-Jihadi* doctrine of designating non-compliant with its creed as *kāfir* (infidels), even if they are Muslims, is foregrounded. Shekau equates different Islamic sects and Saudi Arabia with unbelievers in a set of relational processes through the copula verb "are". Lastly in the last clause in the text, Shekau declares: "We (carrier) are (relational process) people of *sunnah* (attribute)". In this clause, the copula verb, "are" equates *Boko Haram* with "people of *sunnah"*. The completive in the preposition group that qualifies the nominal head, that is *sunnah* is a term in Islam which denotes what is right. This linguistic resource represents the *Salafi-Jihadi* ideology because, as implied in the text, *sunnah* consists in using violence, where necessary, to attain its objectives.

Furthermore, the Islamisation goal of *Salafi-Jihadists* also reflects in text 11 where Shekau, through the conversion of the abducted Chibok girls, expresses delight that the girls have now become Muslims. First, he asks a rhetorical question in which the verbal group "have converted" indicates a material process in which the girls have undergone a transformation process from their previous religion(s) to Islam. In the next clause, the girls represented by the third person plural pronoun "they"are given the agency of undergoing an Islamisation process by memorizing two chapters of the Qur'ān. The last indicator in the text portrays the girls in a verbal process: "Girls from Chibok (sayer) [are] confessing (verbal process) that Islam is the true religion (verbiage). The verbiage serves as proof of the girls' conversion, and that they have jettisoned their initial faith(s).

Boko Haram has an agenda to implement a radical change in Nigeria's socio-political outlooks. However, the means it has chosen to achieve this is *Salafi-Jihadism,* an ideology whose creed blends violence with religion to displace any political institution that contradicts it or fails to conform to its interpretation of the Qur'ān, *Hadith* or *Sunnah*. The sect might have opted for *Salafi-Jihadism* probably because it feels other radical Islamic sects have been compromised.

4.1.4 Anti-Westernization
In the following extracts, *Boko Haram* expresses an ideology that is opposed to Western influences in Nigeria:

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12

All what you are doing is **wrong**. *Your education*, *lifestyle, even your Constitution.Your rule and regulation are* **unfair**. *Nigeria Constitution gave you* **wrong rights** but we do not have any constitution other than Koran.
Published by Sahara TV on January 15, 2018

13

I **abducted** *girls at a Western education school and you are disturbed*. *I* **saidwestern education should end;** *western education should end*. Girls, you should go and get married. I abducted your girls. I will sell them in the market by Allah. There is a market for selling humans. Allah says I should sell. He commands me to sell. I will sell women, I sell women.
                    Published by TVC on May 5, 2014

14

As long as you are under the Constitution, **you are an infidel**. *As long as you are under Democracy, you go to Western schools*, **you are an infidel**. So your fasting and prayer are waste of time. Our interest is not in killing you but you see that you accept the true worship of God. This is our brief message.
            Published by SaharaTV on September 3, 2017

15

Our goal is *to see the Koran being followed on earth*. This is **our focus**.
        Published by Sahara TV on 15 January, 2018

In the first two clauses of text 12, Shekau, through relational processes gives negative attributes to Nigeria: ''wrong'' and ''unfair''. These two linguistic indicators denote unjust, illegal or unacceptable, and indicate denunciation of Western practices in Nigeria, especially in education, lifestyle and use of a constitution. The direct goal realised by the nominal group, ''wrong rights'' is an oxymoron as it equates what Nigerians call rights with wrongs, thereby conveying Shekau's ridicule of constitutionalism. Also, Shekau asserts *Boko Haram*'s rejection of Western practices in the last clause in the extract through a negative transitivity process: ''we (carrier) do not have (relational process) any constitution (possession). The inclusion of the negator ''not'' in the verbal group in the clause above means that the carrier (*Boko Haram*) does not have the possession: ''any constitution''. This resentment betrays him and his sect as expressing a dissent ideology that is opposed to Western influence on Nigeria as a political entity.

In text 13, Shekau expresses dislike for anything that indicates Western influence in Nigeria through material and verbal processes. In the material process above, the goal and circumstance of the crime verb ''abducted'' in the clause are indicators of anti-West ideology in the discourse. Abduction of girls at a Western school is symbolically an expression of aversion for Western education, because it implies that Shekau would not have abducted the girls if they were in an Islamic school. In the verbal process, the verbiage ''Western education should end'' betrays *Boko Haram* as having an anti-West ideology. He is not asking Islamic schools to end but Western ones, hence the attack on them in order to force them to stop that form of education.

In addition, text 14 reiterates *Boko Haram*'s dislike for Democracy, Constitution and Western education. In the information structure of the first two sentences in the extract, the adverbial clauses of condition are given information which are the shared knowledge of what obtains in Nigeria as regards Western practices, while the new information is the verdict of the sect on those who meet the condition of being under a Constitution, Democracy and Western education. Shekau's verdict on such people is this: ''you (carrier) are (relational

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process) an infidel (attribute)''. Lastly, in text 15, Shekau equates the goal of the sect with seeing "the Qur'ān being followed on earth'' through the copula verb "is". The Qur'ān is the alternative *Boko Haram* offers in place of the Constitution. Moreover, since Constitution, Democracy and Western education are all not in tandem with seeing the Qur'ān as the absolute authority, *Boko Haram* has to take an anti-Westernization stance to have the 'will' of God done in Nigeria.

Anti-Westernisation stance is an ideological war that the sect thinks has to be waged to disconnect Nigeria from the corrupting influence of the West, which according to the sect, has impacted negatively on the Northern political class, as manifested in deep-rooted corruption and disregard for the laws of God. The sect believes that democracy is inherently a corrupt system, and the Constitution relegates *Shar'āh* to the background. So, these three obstacles, as evidently proposed by the sect, must be removed for the Islamic state to be fully instituted.

4.2 Visual Representations of *Boko Haram's* Ideologies
Different ideologies conveyed by *Boko Haram* through various visual modes are analysed under this heading.
4.2.1 State Religion
PLATE 1

Screenshot of Shekau and His Men in One of their Caliphates
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GlsPW4anHUM&t=13s

Plate 1 has Shekau standing on a rostrum in a house that may be described as the State House of one of the towns newly harnessed in his Islamic caliphate. He is giving an address or a sermon. The unshaved beard, turbaned head and the long gown put on by Shekau portray him as a cleric, while his subordinates who are either masked or armed with weapons of warfare are portrayed as Shekau's guards. But in the second order level of semantic analysis, he is the caliph of the caliphate, while the other men are the security agents in the caliphate. The whole semantic space occupied by the men serves as a model of what the new caliphate is to look like, and thus creates the picture of a state by Muslims and for Muslims. The visual is therefore an ideological representation of state religion as an alternative to the secular Nigeria.

4.2.2 Reliance on Divine Power
PLATE 2

Leader of *Boko Haram,* Shekau with some of His Men
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PEnWvbyiis

In Plate 2, a pile of books, presumably the Holy Qur'ān, is in front of Shekau and his men. Salience is given to the pile of copies of Qur'āns to make them more eye-catching. The Qur'ān is a holy book believed to be very powerful. Projecting the book is to project the idea that the book is the source of *Boko Haram*'s power which is why the sect has been invincible to the Nigerian state. So, *Boko Haram* is sending a message to the Nigerian state that it would not be able to subdue it, as no human power can conquer the power of God, which is resident in the holy Qur'ān, the source of its power. Also, the background of the semantic space is black. Black represents resilience and longevity. The prominence of black in the semantic space speaks of strength, resilience and longevity. When this representation is placed side-by-side with the ideology underlying the display of copies of Qur'āns, the sect is saying that its power, invincibility and resilience is as a result of its reliance on the power of God.

4.2.3 *Salafi-Jihadism*
PLATE 3

Screenshot of Shekau and some of His Men
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dQd1wMikllM&t&t=4575

In Plate 3, the attire of the men betrays the sect as espousing *Salafi-Jihadism* doctrine. In the visual, the men are dressed as combatants, but the leader, who is at the centre is wearing turban and long beards, as Muslim clerics do, is reading from an open book (which can be seen as the sect's creed). The combatant dressing indicates violence on one hand, while the turban and the long beards depict a preacher on the other hand. This awkward dressing reveals that the men are preachers of violence in the name of religion. Lastly, the logo of the sect located at the right top corner corroborates the other features. The logo has an open Qur'ān resting on two guns whose butts touch each other. These two symbols contradict each other because an open Qur'ān represents Islam or peace, while gun represents violence/conflict. The aggregate meaning of all these binary contradictions (semiotic features) in the visual above is that *Boko Haram* espouses *Salafi-Jihadism*, a creed which advocates violence in the name of Islam for socio-political ends.

4.2.4 Anti-Westernization
PLATE 4

Screenshot of Vandalised Dormitory of the FGGC, Chibok
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzIoEuxKkE

Plate 7 is the charred remains of a dormitory at the Federal Government Girls' College, Chibok after it was attacked by *Boko Haram*. The dormitory has been vandalised, and the iron bunks there have been burnt and disorganised. The scene does not reflect an academic environment again. The visual conveys attack on Western education in Nigeria by *Boko Haram.* The visual is therefore a representation of the ideological stance of *Boko Haram* on Western education – the sect is averse to it.

5.1 Conclusion
This study focused on how *Boko Haram* represents its ideologies through verbal and visual modes. The analyses showed that *Boko Haram* espousesvarious ideologies such as state religion, reliance on divine power, Jihadi-Salafism and anti-westernization. All these ideological stances were expressed verbally through transitivity patterns and information structure, and visually through dressing, embodiment, symbols among other visuals in the semiotic spaces of the visuals, respectively. Lastly, *Boko Haram* quite understood the socio-political contexts of Nigeria, and it explored the contexts to its advantage in the construction of its ideologies throughout the discourse. For instance, *Boko Haram* explored the religious and political sentiments in the country to its advantage to express power and dominance over the Nigerian state.

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