

Interrogating Challenges of Sectarianism, Terrorism and Socio-Economic Development of Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examined the challenges of sectarian and terrorism crises with special focus on Boko Haram terrorism and its effects on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. Sectarianism and terrorism is a canker worm that has eaten deep into the fabrics of the Nigerian state with its negative implications on the well-being of the people. To achieve this objective, the paper adopted the descriptive design as a basis of analysis. The paper also employed the State Failure theory as a framework of analysis. The choice of this theory is in line with the inability of the Nigeria state to address the seemingly intractable sectarian and most recently, the Boko-Haram crisis which has threatened her corporate existence over the years. There exist several religions in Nigeria and many of them are exploited for political gains. Within the last couple of decades, Nigeria has witnessed astronomical rise in the number of radical Islamic sects notably among them, Maitasine, Darul Islam, and Boko Haram. These sects have resorted to the use of violence in a bid to realize their ambitions of a wider islamization of the Nigerian population. Three of the most prominent perspectives shared on the rise of these radical movements are: poor socio-economic infrastructures and poor governance, poverty and aiding of religious extremism by politicians for their selfish ambition. This study reveals that while it is true that socio-economic factors may drive the radicalization and politicization of religious sects in the country, the fear of domination and indeed the fight for supremacy is at the heart of the current terrorism-insurgency in northeastern Nigeria. The conclusion is also that sectarian and terrorists activities have posed serious challenges on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. Recommendations were made on the need for an urgent initiation of bottom-top security approach anchored on local community intelligence. Transparency, probity and accountability in public governance process are irreducible minimum requirements for good governance and sound economic performance for improved citizens' living conditions so as to tame the rising wave of sectarian and terrorists activities in the country.

Keywords: Sectarianism, Terrorism, Politics, Socio-Economic Development

Introduction

The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended) clearly prohibits the practice of State religion. It guarantees freedom of religion and forbid any form of discrimination on the basis of religious beliefs. Also Section 10 of the same constitution specifies that Nigeria or any of its sub-units shall not adopt any religion as state religion. This section clearly presupposes Nigeria as a secular State. However, Nigeria's experience is at variance with the type of secularism expressed in Continental Europe which tends to bare religious activities from public life and confines it to the private sphere. In principle, secularism calls for the separation of government institutions and personnel from sacred and the profane. Put in political context, it means the separation of religious activities from public life of the people and government.

The lack of separation of the state and religion as contained in our constitution is fundamental to the understanding of the rise of sectarian and religious crisis in Nigeria. Christianity and Islamic activities have greater influence on the socio-economic, cultural and political life of the people in the country. Each believes it has a special relationship with God that excludes other religions. Although much has been written on political Islam, there is no general agreement at the level of definition (Nwanegbo and Odigbo, 2013). This has created not only the problem of conceptualization but also a corresponding problem of prefixing. What is political Islam and how best can it be defined? Nonetheless, the paper assumes the position of a conceptual plurality necessary for the understanding of Political Islam as a term used to label the wide-scale activities of individuals or organizations advocating transformation of the state and entire society according to "Islamic" rules. The term is often used in connection with the movements which represent political powers in the name of Islam, emerging at the end of the 20th century. Whether it is called political Islam: militant Islam, radical Islam, extremist Islam, fundamentalist Islam and revolutionary Islam are reconstructed categories deemed necessary as they are believed to characterize political Islam.

The 21st century is exemplified by violence prevalent in human interactions. In Nigeria, sectarianism and terrorism phenomena are perceived and acknowledged as the greatest threats that confronts contemporary Nigerian society and the world at large. The activities of the various sects and terrorists have posed a great challenge to the corporate existence and survival of the country and many other nations. For Nigeria, these have become one of the national question to be addressed with every sense of responsibility and urgency it deserves. No wonder, Osabiya (2015) affirms that the national question involves the unresolved contradictions in the society that have continued to entrench Nigeria in a brutal circle of crisis. It is against the backdrop of the foregoing that, this paper examined the vexacious question of sectarianism and the recent terrorism problematic as a challenge to socio-economic development of Nigeria with a view to

identifying the immediate and remote causes of these crisis and a way forward for peaceful co-existence in Nigeria.

The Concept of Sectarianism

Salameh (2017) describes the word, ‘sect’ as a community that subscribes to certain religious beliefs from the past. These beliefs, at the time of their formation, were the expression of the ideological and class formation of a certain social group. This conceptual formation is transformed into a religious belief when there is a societal collapse and social groups become closed, whereupon these conceptualisations are reformulated as “mythological” beliefs. The sect is a group of people who were born to certain beliefs. Their beliefs often survive only cosmetically: people practice some celebratory or funerary rituals, or marry into the same sect for reasons of continuity. But these inherited beliefs do not serve as a basis for relations with the larger society where more common traditions and customs, both in urban and rural societies, are more prevalent. These beliefs generally recede against modernist ideas allowing for more societal integration (Oche and Dokubo,2001; Nwolise, 2012).

Sectarianism on the other hand, is any religious or sectarian barrier that is based on inherited beliefs against the ‘other’. That is to say: sectarianism is turning diversity to conflict. Without doubt this diversity is a result of an ancient conflict; however, the conflict at that time had economic and ideological bases for a political and ideological class conflict. Whereas before they represented intellectual currents rooted in material social classes and conditions, this language of an old struggle is used today in an essentialist way that has no relation to ideologies or classes. There is a subheading which we could call, sectarian instrumentalisation. This means that, a certain class could utilise these inherited beliefs to advance its own interests, without necessarily believing in them. This can be seen in the context of a class defense of its own privileges and existence against other classes, or against other sectors from the same class (Midgal, 1994; Osabiya, 2015).

Mushani (2009) and Salameh (2017) has further argued that, sectarianism is the tendency to undermine social cohesion by pushing for the reproduction of ancient beliefs and separations. This process is not exclusive to religious minorities, but can also be observed in the majority as well. Sectarianism is the system that best preserves the classist hierarchy and the dominance of the colonial bourgeois class interests (this is in communities with diverse confessional backgrounds), where tribalism might prevail in other types of community. The difference between sectarian and religious regimes is that in the case of a religious regime, one is subjected to an absolutist religious hegemony that allows no sharing of power with any other religious groups, as is the case in Iran and Saudi Arabia. A sectarian regime, on the other hand, presupposes power-sharing between different religious minorities on the basis of quota, even if the system is overwhelmingly

dominated by one of them (Nocella, 2004; Hubert, 2001). The relationship between sectarianism and terrorism is that while terrorism is the actual use or threat to use of indiscriminate force against non-combat people with the aim of motivating an impulse by the state or a powerful group or to induce a state of fear among its various victims utilizing ruthless strategies that does not conform to humanitarian norms, sectarianism is turning diversity into conflict. Both concepts have a relationship based on the fact that they all emphasize violence.

The Concept of Terrorism

While it is accepted globally that terrorism is a worldwide enigma, there is no such consensus in defining terrorism or even who a terrorist is. Put differently, scholars of terrorism studies have long struggled to agree on a common understanding of what terrorism is. To date, they have agreed on a little more than the fact that the concept is arduous to decipher. As a result, Meisels (2006) states that a hundred to two hundred modern definitions of the concept may have been formulated, wherein, Boylan (2009, p. 2) adds that different aspects of terrorism are “stressed including motives, applied tactics, and chosen targets”.

Since deciphering the concept has become laborious, a study by Schmidt and Youngman (1988, cited in Mushani, 2009) provides a gainful insight into the most relevant aspects of the definition of the concept of terrorism to include use of force (or threat) of violence, political objective(s) and the intention of instilling fear in a target population as a means of achieving the set objectives. The above perspective therefore forms the basis for many definitions of the concept, no matter how variegated the several attempts put forward by experts on the subjects may be.

Like other scholars, Anger (2002) posits that there is want of a universal definition of terrorism due to reason of politics rather than semantics. This is because actors and stakeholders tend to twist the definition to suit their purpose. Njoku (2011) also agrees that the concept of terrorism is shrouded in a lot of controversies, questioning the constituents of terrorism and adds a new twist to the argument. To him, terrorism can be perceived from either an idealist or realist conception. The idealist school of thought emphasizes that every act that produces fear, terror, or death, whether legitimately carried out or not, by an individual, group or state, is an act of terrorism. The realists on the other hand, perceive terrorism as essentially an attack by clandestine groups against non-combatants or civilians in order to draw attention by imbuing fear into the people's public life so as to coerce them into a state of the actor from carrying out an action for their political objectives.

In spite of the definitional challenge, Todd and Keith (1995) attempted to define terrorism as a predetermined use of, or even the threat to utilize excessive violence or brutality to gain political objectives via intimidation and/or fear. This entails that terrorism can be achieved by direct physical violence or even threat that leads to the achievement of specific objectives like fear or psychological imbalance which could be political. Dickson (2005) agreed with Todd and Keith's view point when he admitted in a related manner that terrorism is premeditated or threat to use violence pursuant to political gains and objectives through intimidation of targeted audience with an overall motive of making right the perceived wrong.

In their attempt to define terrorism, Dahl (1976); Goldstein (1999) and Kegley and Wittkopf (1999) confine themselves to the motives of terrorists which they agree is political. They opine that terrorism refers to political violence which targets non-combatants indiscriminately, deliberately and consciously in order to influence attention and audience. As commendable as the above attempt at defining terrorism may be, it lost sight of current realities and demands of terrorists. Though the paper agrees with their view that politics is at the center of terrorism, current trends have also shown that some acts of terrorism move a little bit away from core political pursuits even though they have such undertones. This explains why some terrorist groups are separatists, some ethno-centric and some nationalists and yet some animal rights activists. Some groups are revolutionary while some remain religious and yet some assume a social posture. It should be noted that if a terrorist group adopts the kidnap strategy to abduct a lowly rated man in society, it may not motivate a political action such as legislation against it. On the contrary, if a minister becomes a victim of the same group, it may elicit a different kind of reaction by the government.

For the sake of emphasis, it is worthy of note that this paper is in tune with the fact that no matter a terrorist groups' posture, demands are made that only political outcomes can settle. Most recently terrorists hardly make demands, even when they do, such demands are always almost impossible to make. The Nigeria Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2011, p. 1) in its description of the concept attempts to fill the gap identified in Goldstein and Wittkopf and Kegley's definition above. According to the Act:

Terrorism is described as the calculated and extreme use of violence or threatened violence, perpetrated by malice, to cause serious harm or violence against individuals, government and their assets with the intention to attain political, religious or ideological goals, through intimidation or coercion or instilling fear on civilian population.

Though this paper shares the view of scholars who argue that a comprehensive definition of terrorism does not exist and cannot be found in the foreseeable future, it is worthy to attempt a definition in order to beam more light towards the understanding of the

concept. This is done without any such claim that the attempt captures the entire or even represents the concept completely. By our understanding, terrorism simply means any violent act perpetrated by a group of people which is intended to instil fear, coercion and force in order to force the other person or group to conform or surrender.

Having considered the various definition of terrorism, it is important to peruse on a general note, the elements of the definitions featured in the definitions above. Like Schimdt and Youngman (1988) cited in Mushani (2009) observes, while some definitions feature some elements of the terrorists such as motives, identity, and methods, the definitions failed to explicitly address the following:

- (i) Explicit intention of the terrorist (self-defense, power, and freedom).
- (ii) What methods constitute terrorism (use of weaponry, public disorder, singular murder or multiple murders).
- (iii) Magnitude of violence- when does it become act of terrorism?
- (iv) The boundary between terrorism and other forms of political violence such as guerrilla violence.
- (v) Whether government terrorism and resistance terrorism are part of the same phenomenon.
- (vi) Separating terrorism from simple criminal acts, from open war between consenting groups and from acts that clearly arise out of mental illness.
- (vii) Can terrorism be legitimate? What gains justify its use? What is the relationship between crime and terrorism?

In other consideration, scholars' attention must be drawn to the fact that though almost all the definitions of terrorism alluded to a common criterion of terrorism which is violence, there is no such common grounds for what amount of violence that constitute terrorism. It has also been observed that the definitions are too broad. While their broadness may allow for generalization of the concept, they also guarantee varying degrees of interpretations of what constitutes terrorism. These generalizations open terrorism up to politicized manipulations, conjectures, and polemical interpretations.

It is also to be noted that though some definitions briefly mention terrorists' motifs, the definitions did not however address issues of intent. Though motive and intent appear as one and the same, they do have a fundamental difference. While motive refers to the reason why a person chooses to engage in a particular act, intent however, is the conscious objective or purpose, plan and will to act in a particular way (Geddes and Grosset, 1994). It is possible for different terrorist groups to possess similar motives, but they often hardly have identical intentions.

On yet another note, the definitions of terrorism did not take into cognizance the difference between guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The similarity of the two creates the enabling grounds for confusion. For instance, guerrilla violence remains selective; guerrillas usually only attack the government and its 'net of safety', unlike terrorists who use indiscriminate violence without formal code of conduct and place no limits on the selection of their targets.

Owing to the inconsistencies that becloud the definitions of terrorism, it is imperative for this paper to implement a model definition of the concept. In this case, the UN Academic Consensus Definition which is more specific in what constitutes terrorism is considered and adopted by this paper. The Academic Consensus Definition as crafted by Schmid (2011) cited in Nwolise (2012) on behalf of the organization conceptualizes terrorism as:

...an anxiety-inspired method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby-in contrast to assassination-the direct targets of violence are not the targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), imperiled victims and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s), turning it into a target of terror, a target demands or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.

For the fact that *Boko-Haram* fits into Jihadists terrorist organization, there is credence in defining religious terrorism as distinct from other forms of terrorism. According to Hoffman (2006, p. 124), religious terrorism is:

Motivated either in whole or in part by religious imperatives, where violence is regarded by its practitioners as a divine duty or sacramental act, emphasizing markedly different means of legitimization and justification than that committed by secular terrorists, and these distinguishing features leads, in turn, to yet greater bloodshed and destruction.

Examples of Islamic terrorist groups include al-Qaeda, Hamas, Boko-Haram, al-Shabaab, Taliban and the Islamic State among others. As Muslim jihadist terrorist movements see disunity in the Moslem world as the cause behind Islamic vulnerability. Because Islam is fractured along ethnic, national and sectarian lines, it is difficult to unite the faithful into a global movement.

These Jihadists see the perceived common hatred of the West and Westernization as a catalyst that could unite Islam and it is this trans-continental clash that fuels modern day jihadi terrorism's global reach (Sparago, 2007). One common feature of jihadi terrorist groups is that they subscribe to *Salafist* school of thought or the return to tradition and pure Islam. The return includes the re-establishment of the caliphate and the implementation of Boko-Haram Law (Yapes, 2005). Some under this group may be followers of *Wahhabism* (a branch of Sunni Islam described as orthodox). Wahhabism started from Saudi Arabia and it is therefore Saudi specific form of Salafism, Osama bin Laden and many other al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups were/are driven by this Islamic school of thought.

The lack of consensus on what constitutes terrorism, points to its inseparable political nature, perhaps best encapsulated by Truman (2003, p. 118) in the following words: "One man's terrorist act is another man's freedom fighter", "Terrorism to some, is heroism to others", and "today's terrorist is tomorrow's freedom fighter". Indeed, given the foregoing argument, a consensual definition of terrorism will continue to elude us.

Types and Forms of Modern Terrorism

Medhurst (2002) identified different types of terrorism to include *domestic*, *international* and *transnational* terrorism. In a similar fashion, Abimbola and Adesote (2012) also identified some types of terrorism to include *state-bond*, *non-state bond* and *cross-border* terrorism, while state bond terrorism is orchestrated and aided by the state like in the Nazi regime against the Jews in 1939-1945, non-state bond terrorism is carried out by clandestine groups independent of the state, like the *Maitatsine* activities in the 1980s and those of *Boko-Haram* (especially before 2015). The cross-national or border terrorism has external and international connections. Ojukwu (2011) also refer to al-Qaeda and al Shabaab, whose activities cut across boundaries as examples.

In his contribution, Anger (2002) identified four types or categories of terrorism. There are *transnational*, *international*, *state terrorism* and *domestic*. He explained that transnational terrorism is carried out basically by autonomous, non- state actors irrespective of some degree of support from sympho-thetic state. On the other hand, international terrorism refers to such actions as carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a state and domestic terrorism is devoid of nationals of more than one state(s). To Anger, one will be right to refer to this sort of terrorism as the domestic parallel of international terrorism which is carried out by non-state actors. The lethality of this kind of terrorism is tilted towards only citizens of one state. Lastly, state terrorism refers to actions by national governments or sovereign states within the boundaries of that state.

Narrowing down domestic terrorism as identified by Anger (2002), Odeleye (2013) identified different types of domestic terrorism to include; civil disorder, political terrorism, religious extremism, non-political radicalism, quasi terrorism, and official or state terrorism. It must be understood that one common decimal of all forms of terrorism is infliction of fear, and harm (real or imagined and it could be mental, psychological and physical).

While scholars may have differed on what constitutes types or forms of terrorism, this paper holds that there is: Religious terrorism, political terrorism, criminal terrorism, sub-state terrorism, revolutionary terrorism, nationalist/separatist terrorism, right wing movement, left wing terrorism, state sponsored terrorism, pathological terrorism, state/regime terrorism and single issue terrorism.

Sources of Financing Terrorism Activities

All terrorist groups are formed by idealists with particular ideologies and they have to spend money to further their ideologies. In other words, modern terrorists do not live by enthusiasm alone; they need a great deal of money to entrench their ideologies. In fact, Giraldo and Trinkuna (2007) cited in Anyadike (2013) and Aykin and Sozmen (2009) identify finance as the “life blood” of terrorists. According to them, terrorist needs cash to sustain their propaganda, recruitment, training and retraining of members, to acquire arms and ammunition for establishment of support networks and maintenance of camps and other logistics like fake means of identification, travel documents, accommodation among others.

What then is terrorist financing? In its article 12 (1 & 3) the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) provides that (i) Any person who wilfully provides or collects by any means, directly or indirectly, any money by any other person with intent that the money shall be used for any act of terrorism, commits an offence under the this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life; (ii) Any person who makes funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services available for use of any other person to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of a terrorist act is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life.

Financing terrorism is indeed a deep rooted practice characterized by extreme confidentiality, scheme, criminality and high degree of sophistication, complexity smattering know-how of the global financial system. Raphaeli (2003, p. 59) simply put it as: “an octopus with tentacles spreading across vast territories as well as across a whole range of religious, social, economic and political realities”. Before, the September 11 (9/11) terrorist attack in US, the concept of “terrorism financing” existed but only as a crime on its own and never found its way into any anti-money laundering framework. The attack on US by al-Qaeda motivated a new interest into the concept by institutions

and brought awareness into the various aspects of the crime (Mushani, 2009). In fact, al-Qaeda and Bin Laden's economic and financial empire constitute a transnational financial engine, a considerable section of which is composed of legitimate businesses as stated by Schnider (2004a, 2004); and Camras (2005, 2007).

Most literatures have indicated that high flow of funds to terrorists was substantial during the cold war. According to Schnider and Caruso (2011), these flows are said to stem from oil-rich regimes that began to pump large sums of money into terrorist financial system. An example can be found in Libya in 1970s, and Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini, beginning in the 1980s (Cooper, 2001).

Though it is worthy of note that terrorist financing and its mechanism is diverse and dynamic, Adams (1986) and Chine and Alexander (1987) contends that there exist two major sources of funds for terrorism: state sponsorship and illegal activities. Further, he states that state sponsorship of terrorism declined very well after the cold war era. Before then, it was common for Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Libya among others, to give safe haven and finance to groups like the IRA, PLO and other clandestine groups. Napoleoni (2005) further relates that state sponsorship of terrorism evolved over time. This evolution throughout the twentieth century were in three phases viz: state sponsors during the Cold War period; privatization of funding by exploiting valuable resources in failed states in the early 1990s; and utilization of global financial and trade markets after the establishment of free trade zones and globalized economy in the past decades (Best and Nocella, 2004).

In their contributions, Schneider and Caruso (2011) split the sources of funding terrorism into legal and illegal sources. While it is certain that not all funds utilized by terrorists come from illegal sources, Yapes (2008) argues that legitimate financing of terrorists is related to completely legal activities conducted in form of charities and other forms of businesses. The 9/11 Commission reports points out a core number of financial facilitators involved in raising, moving, and storing the money al Qaeda used from donors primarily in the Gulf region but also from other countries around the world. Comras (2007) adds that these groups used legitimate charities and businesses as cover to develop a substantial financial network. Such legal sources of finance include state sponsorship, private (individual and corporate) donors, ethnic community and religious financing, charity and legal businesses. Illegal sources of terrorist financing as identified by Aykin and Sozmen (2009) include drug trafficking, oil-smuggling, and diamond and arms trafficking, among others.

In expanding the frontiers of counter-terrorism, US combined both legal and illegal sources of terror financing and develop four typologies which illustrates some of the methods and techniques employed by terrorists and terrorist groups to finance and/or

support terrorist activities. The various typologies are: Terrorist financing through smuggling of arms, assets and currencies; terrorist financing through drug trafficking; terrorist financing through trade and other lucrative activities and terrorist financing through NGOs, charity organisations and levies.

In addition, FATF Report (2013) points to two other sources to include terrorist financing through Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and alternative system, particularly called *hawala* indicated above. It may be paramount to add that in Nigeria in particular, leaders and business men contribute in funding Boko-Haram terrorist activities (Zenn, 2014). Baldwin (1997) and Ehrenfeld (2003) categorizes funding of terrorism into two: operational and strategic. Operational funding sources are for short term operational purposes and represent a flexible means to arms financing. Such operational finances are largely task oriented and does not require modest investment and most of them have been funded through legal and illegal “soft financing activities.

Theoretical Framework: The State Failure Theory

The state failure theory protagonists are; Weber (1978) cited in Stone, (2009), William Zartman and Robert Rotberg. These scholars sees the state as first and foremost a service provider. Zartman cited in Jev and Dzoho (2014) posits that, when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed, it means the state has failed. A failed state theory argues that, when a state has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly, such a state has failed. Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental collapse. The nation-states exist to provide political goods and social services for citizens living within their borders (Rotberg, 2003, cited in Nwolise, 2012). States can either succeed or fail in discharging these responsibilities. When states fail, it means that they are incapable of either delivering adequate political goods to their citizens or taking full control of their territories. Such internal challenges could also mean that the state has lost its monopoly over the use of force or can no longer guarantee security by central sovereign leadership. In cases of severe state failure, the state loses its legitimacy, and its capacity to safeguard its citizens and control over its people becomes eroded. Rotberg (2003), cited in Nwolise, (2012) condenses the criteria of state failure into three main categories such as; economic stagnation, political instability, and loss of state’s legitimacy. According to him, the economic sphere is hamstrung by a lack of public goods and services, the flourishing of corruption and rent-seeking, and financially precarious circumstances. In the political sphere, leaders and their cronies subvert prevailing democratic norms, manipulate legislative laws, disregard the rule of law, compromise judicial independence, repress civil societies, and abuse security and defense forces. Consequently, corrupt ruling elites engage in conspicuous and ostentatious consumption by building

numerous duplexes and buying properties both at home and abroad, and stoking stolen funds in foreign bank accounts.

Within the context of the prevailing situation, one can argue that, the state failure theory in Nigeria can thus be justified. Indeed, the myriad of vexatious and intractable sectarian and terrorist problems and challenges explain rather graphically the reasons various sects such as *Boko Haram*, Niger Delta Avengers, etc. could operate swiftly in the Nigerian public sphere. The inability of the Nigerian state to address those issues convincingly is what has led to some section of the country to resort to violence and terror as an option for survival, but also as a means to rebel against a state deemed to have failed (Anyadike, 2013).

The concept of state failure as applied to the Nigerian state would be used to describe the different level of institutional and governance crises within the country that has affected the state to meet the aspirations of the people (Amuwo & Olaitan, 1994; Vogt, 1999, cited in Call, 2008). The several unending crisis of governance in Nigeria has not just increased anxiety, frustration and aggression but, also led to several sectarian and terrorist activities with the most recent been *Boko Haram* in the Northeast part of Nigeria.

Despite the contributions to the political analysis, the failed state theory has been criticized along two main strands. The first argues that the term lends itself to overgeneralization, by lumping together different governance problems amongst diverse countries, and without accounting for variations of governance within states. The second is concerned with the political application of the term in order to justify military interventions and state-building based on a Western model of the state. The concept of state failure “has no coherent definition”, with indexes combining various indicators of state performance with arbitrary weights to arrive at unclear and aggregated measurements of state fragility. Call (2008) argues that the label of ‘failed state’ has been applied so widely that it has been effectively rendered useless.

The failed state theory also provides an unclear understanding of what state failure means. Further critique for the manner in which the ‘failed state’ concept has been understood and operationalized is brought forth in research by Morten and Jennings cited in Abimbola and Adesote (2012, p. 134) who, drawing on five case studies—Afghanistan, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, and the Niger Delta region of Nigeria—argues that "the use of the ‘failed state’ label is inherently political, and based primarily on Western perceptions of Western security and interests". They go on to suggest that Western policy-makers attribute the 'failed' label to those states in which 'recession and industrialization of the state is perceived to be a threat to Western interests'. Furthermore, this suggests a hypocritical approach on behalf of Western policy-makers, due to the fact

that the characteristics that would lead certain states to be labelled as failed are accepted in other states where these characteristics are in accordance with Western interests. In fact, "this feature of state functioning is not only accepted, but also to a certain degree facilitated, as it creates an enabling environment for business and international capital. These cases are not branded 'failed states'.

The theory has been criticized for being teleological, ahistorical and reflecting a Western bias of what constitutes a successful state. Inherent in the concept of the failed state is the assumed association with terrorism and other transnational threats. They are sometimes described as incubators for international terrorism. It promotes an unclear understanding of what state failure means (Charles, (2010).Based on evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa; citizens of failed states are attracted to political violence because of the deteriorating conditions within this type of states. Focusing on individual citizens decision-making patterns, it is suggested that "individuals living in failed states are attracted to political violence because the system is broken, which means the state has failed in its duty" (Charles, 2010, p. 67).

The theory of state failure is relevant to this paper. Situating the Maitasine, Darul Islam, and *Boko-Haram* and the Niger Delta and the most recent which is herdsmen/farmers impasse within the context of state failure in Nigeria can thus be justified. Indeed, the foregoing myriad of vexatious and intractable problems and challenges explain rather graphically the reasons why *Boko-Haram* terror and herdsmen could operate swiftly in the country with impunity.

Sectarianism, Terrorism and Socio-Economic Development: The Nexus

Detailed studies measuring the negative socio-economic impact of sectarian and terrorism activities such as the Boko Haram insurgency and the political uncertainty it has engendered since these sectarian and terrorists activities were reported, have been presented differently by various scholars and stakeholders alike. However, some economists have calculated and predicted significant consequences of the violence on Nigeria's growth rate (Rice, 2012). A number of foreign investors and local businesses are said to have abandoned investment plans for northern Nigeria because of Boko Haram insurgency (Anaro, 2012). There are attempts by some wealthy Nigerians to sell real estate assets in Abuja and other parts of the country due to increasing attacks since the return of democratic rule in Nigeria (Rice, 2012). Although some analysts have argued that 'today's Nigeria is strong enough to avoid protracted crisis' (Moyo, 2012), many prominent Nigerians, including Wole Soyinka, the Nobel prize-winning Nigerian author, have however, warned of the possibility of the crisis degenerating into a civil war if not checked (Reuters, January 16, 2012). More importantly, there are also growing signs that Nigerian violence and instability may be spreading across the border, thereby affecting her neighbouring countries (Rice, 2012; Awoyemi, 2012). Growing evidence of

the involvement of foreign terrorist organizations in the *Boko-Haram* violence, both as foot soldiers and financial/trainers has become visible (Meehan and Speicer, 2011; Krech, 2011).

The dominant explanations for the upsurge of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria, (Enweremadu and Njoku, 2017), have until now centered on widespread poverty, ignorance, political marginalization and power struggle among Nigerian political elites. But as this study will show, although these positions are useful to some extent in explaining the rise of violence and violent groups, such as the Boko Haram, they are not sufficient, to the extent that they do not account for all the internal and external variables that we observe in practice. For instance, what are the role of external actors and the international spread of fundamentalist religious ideologies and practices in the violence occurring in the Northern part of Nigeria? Enweremadu and Njoku (2017) study which employs secondary data sources, seeks to address this important gap observed in the existing literature, as well as contribute to the ongoing debate on the nature and solution to the various internal insurrections plaguing Nigeria. The central arguments, according to these scholars is that, the upsurge and persistence of violence, especially by the *Boko-Haram* terrorist group can largely be attributed to religious extremism; a deep sense of ideological feelings supplanted by sets of activities aimed at protecting ones religious cleavage. This dimension of religious extremism in Nigeria can further be traced to foreign ideologies, writings and teachings of Islamic scholars such as the Pakistani Islamist, Abdul A'la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb from Egypt, which was the ideological foundation behind the Iranian revolution that had a spill-over effect in all parts of the world including most parts of Northern Nigeria in the late 1970s and 1980s (Enweremadu and Njoku, 2017).

In recent years, sectarianism and terrorism has shown new patterns, shifting increasingly from military targets to civilian targets with terrorist activities including individuals and business activities. These terrorist attacks have affected both the national and the global economy. The economic consequences can be largely broken down into short-term direct effects; medium-term effects and longer term productivity effects.

Ibietan, Chidozie and Ujara (2014), in their analysis submits that, the direct economic costs of terrorism and sectarian conflicts have been the destruction of lives and properties. It has also created emergency crisis leading to huge sums of money for restoration of the systems and the infrastructure affected. The provision of temporary shelter to huge number of refugees and the ever-increasing demands on government in terms of financial cost of fighting the activities of these terrorists has negatively impacted on the socio-economic development of Nigeria, especially in the North-eastern part of the country. Apart from financial implications, there is great effect in terms of manpower loss. A good number of Nigerian citizens and security personnel are daily lost to the

terrorist group's criminal activities. In fact, it has been revealed that the cost of financing the fight against *Boko-Haram* and other terrorist activities is put at well over ₦ 1 trillion naira as of 2017 apart from losses incurred from agricultural productivity, health and education sectors of the economy (World Bank Report, 2017).

The indirect costs of terrorism have also affected the economy to a very large extent by undermining consumer and investor confidence. The activities of terrorism and sectarian crisis have made investors to divert resources to other neighbouring countries for fear of attacks on business installations (Moyo, 2012; Enweremadu and Njoku, 2017). The implication of the foregoing is that, it has reduced the tempo for foreign direct investments (FDI) into the country and as such, reduced socio-economic growth of the nation.

Religious conflict and other sectarian crisis in Nigeria dates back to 1953, when the crisis took place in Tafawa Balewa in 1948; the Igbo massacre of 1966 in the North that followed the counter-coup of the same year which became a matter between the Igbo ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulani Muslims. This crisis laid the foundation for the civil war of 1967 – 1970, which recorded about 3 million lives lost to the war. In 1980, the *Maitatsine* crisis erupted. In the same period, the erstwhile military ruler of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida enrolled Nigeria in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) an action that almost tore Nigeria apart (George and Hilal, 2013; Akinbi, 2015). The efforts to register Nigeria as OIC member aggravated religious tensions in the country, particularly among the Christian group who opposed the move. In reaction, their Muslim counterpart supported the moves, arguing that, smaller African countries with less number of Muslim adherents were members and so it was right for Nigeria to also join the OIC.

Another area of conflicts is the suspicions between Christians and Muslim communities in Nigeria. Rather than preach unity and peace which are the core values of both religions, religious extremism has taken center stage. These suspicions have resulted to crisis of unimaginable proportions, with tremendous loss in terms of human and material resources. The states mostly affected are Kano, Bauchi, Kaduna, Adamawa, Maiduguri and Yobe state. In view of the frequent occurrence of these crises, so much of socio-economic development of those affected states and Nigeria cannot be quantified (Akanbi, 2015).

Exploitation of the media has also become a weapon used to propagate the ideas of the sectarian crisis in Nigeria over the years. The media everywhere is supposed to serve as a gadfly to society. However, in Nigeria the media reports are sometimes seem to be much more sensational instead of reporting the actual events unbiased. In view of this therefore, these crises are usually aggravated. On the other hand, government slow

response to reported cases of tension and acrimony also do not augur well in a multi-ethnic environment such as Nigeria: For instance, the slow manner in which government responded to the activities of *Boko-Haram* when it was first reported, calls for concern as to the failure of the Nigerian state to protect the lives and properties of her citizens. No serious and responsible government will fold its hands and watch citizens been killed for whatever reasons. For instance, the inability of government at the federal level to bring to justice those who killed the leader of *Boko-Haram* in police custody up to now challenges the authority of the government at that time in prosecuting the *Book-Haram* insurgency in the North-East (Eme and Ibietan, 2012; Akanbi, 2015).

The negative implications of security deficits and inaction on the part of government over the years, explains the volume of sectarian and *Boko-Haram* terrorism on the Nigerian State. The negative effect of this security challenges on socio-economic growth and development of the country cannot be over emphasized. Peace is an irreducible minimum requirement and platform for economic progress and transformation. The north-eastern part of the country has been reduced to ashes and a shadow of itself. The ugly situation has resulted to deteriorating unemployment crisis and worsening food crises in the country. There is no doubt that *Boko-Haram* insurgency has exacerbated the situation of misery, poverty and pauperization of the citizenry, especially around the North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria. It is common knowledge that economic activities, for over 10 years have been grounded in Maiduguri and its environs. The space of development in all sectors has been slowed down. In view of this, therefore, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in its 2016 and 2017 reports on the poverty situation revealed that the poverty stood at 76% while unemployment rates was 68% in the period under review (NBS, 2016, 2017).

The Implications of Terrorism and other Sectarian Crisis on Socio-Economic Development

The implications of terrorism and other sectarian crises on socio-economic development of Nigeria is varied and multifaceted, ranging from socio-psychological to economic and political which affects every nation because they are all connected and thus raising serious questions concerning the religious dimension of such terrorist and sectarian activities. Below are some of the implications of sectarianism and terrorism activities on socio-economic development of Nigeria:

Social/Psychological Implications

Yapes (2008) opines that, the primary and immediate effect of terrorism and sectarian activities has to do with loss of lives and properties. A huge number of lives have been lost and properties worth billions also destroyed, people live in perpetual fear

of insecurity because they do not know the next turn of events, or where it would take place. In the September 11 attacks, for instance, more than three thousand (3000) people were reported killed. The attacks in Kenya and Tanzania killed over two hundred people. The bombing of a night club in Bali in Indonesia on October 12, 2002, killed two hundred people. The Balsam school siege in September 2004 in Russia ended tragically with the death of about three hundred (300) persons, half of who were children (Stephen and Orokpo, 2016). Since the terrorist attacks started in the northeast of Nigeria, several lives have been lost to the crisis. The Human Rights Watch (2017) reported that about 500,000 lives have been lost to the conflict since its inception, several people both school children and old men and women kidnapped. A total of over 27 million people are currently in IDP camps in various locations in the northeast and other neighbouring states (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

One of the greatest concerns and fears existing in the minds of the people is that terrorists could go beyond ordinary explosives and find a way to deploy nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, now referred to as 'weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The fear of the consequences of such action has a terrible psychological impact on the people, particularly those in the northeast who are more susceptible to terrorist attacks (Zabadi, 2005; Subair,2012).

Economic Implications of Terrorism and Sectarian Crises

The implications of terrorism on the economic spheres of the Nigeria society have been immediate and multifaceted. They include the following: With the ever-present fear of attacks from terrorists, governments and organizations all over the world including Nigeria, are compelled to expend huge sums of money to develop anti-terror infrastructure and other means of curbing the spread of terrorists activities. Such funds ordinarily could be used for more beneficial services to the people (Shaheen, 1987; Oche, 2001).

Since the 9/11 terror attacks in US and the subsequent responses by the international community, including the use of military force and full-scale war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the cycle of violence that the situation has engendered, governments, companies and organizations have had to take painful economic measures. These range from reorganization leading to retrenchments of workers, increase in airfares, and withdrawal of subsidies which also invariably leads to inflation with attendants' negative effects on economic growth and further insecurity among nations and in Nigeria in particular (Okeke 2005; Al-Thagafi, 2008).

Investors stay away from target areas or regions perceived as potential source of terrorist activities. The increasing high cost of oil is a direct consequence of terrorist activities and the unending insurgency against the coalition forces in countries like Libya,

Iraq, Syria Somalia, among others has also fueled global insecurity with increasing effects on economies of nation states such as Nigeria with already fragile economy. The security challenges occasioned by rising terrorist activities have negatively impacted on the economic life of the country, leaving poverty and misery in the faces of Nigerian people in all ramifications. Suffice to say that the economy of the entire North-Eastern states of Nigeria is grounded with little activities going on due to terrorist activities (Alao, Atere and Alao, 2012).

Ever since terrorist activities became a global affair, air travels have entered a new era with air security becoming the priority concern of the airline operators/industry. Consequently, not only are huge sums of money spent on counter-terrorism measures, but innocent passengers are made to suffer the rigors of security checks at airports, especially Nigerians because of the failed attempt of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on December 25, 2009 to blow off the plane conveying passengers to US. Apart from that the increasing activities of *Boko-Haram* terrorist activities in the North-eastern part of Nigeria has also heightened security checks on Nigerians for fear of possible attacks (Putnam, 1993; Akinterinwa, 2010).

Political Implications of Terrorism and Sectarian Crisis

The political impact of terrorism and sectarian crisis on socio-economic development can also be immediate and long term in nature. For example, the ruling party in Spain lost power two days after the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings which killed one hundred and eighty one innocent lives. The post-9/11 environments has also relegated the Israeli/Palestinian crisis to the back burner thereby leading to a freeze in the peace process and the result is renewed cycle of violence and growing tension in the region with its attendant global peace and security implications (Stephen and Orokpo, 2016).

In Nigeria, the crisis has a telling effects on the political development of the North-eastern region as well. Apart from governorship and national assembly elections, grassroots political activities have been hampered due to insecurity in the rural areas (Schnider, 2002a; Stone, 2009).

By and large, international terrorism continues to pose difficult challenges, just as the *Boko-Haram* insurgency in the North-eastern part of Nigeria remains a threat to socio-economic development of Nigeria. Terrorism has become a major challenge to state and human security in the international system. Terrorism is a threat to tourism development, energy-sector, civil-aviation, maritime and civil transportation. The act of terrorism transcend national boundaries and because the world has entered a new era of

interdependence, it is no longer possible for a nation to run amok on one frontier while her neighbours on another are hardly aware.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, it could be said that both sectarianism and terrorism crisis have come to stay in the national and international political systems. Both security challenges have emerged as a major threat to modern civilization. Even though in Nigeria, sectarian crisis seem to have been on the down-ward trend in recent times, the emergence of terrorism activities has become a worrisome phenomenon. Though some believe that one man's terrorist is likely to be another man's freedom fighter and one nation's liberation movement could always be another nation's terrorist organization, there is the need for the whole world to tackle this menace, which has the capacity to split the unity of a nation like Nigeria because of the religious nature of such terrorists acts and can literally destroy the world. Without doubt, the war against terrorism has grown beyond the management of a single nation or continent or state and therefore cooperation is vital if there will be meaningful success to be achieved in the fight against terrorism and other security challenges confronting nation states such Nigeria's *Boko-Haram* insurgency.

According to Oche (2006) terrorism is not new in the world and it is very clear that as long as the "State" exists alongside diverse world outlooks and perspectives, the end of the phenomenon is not in sight. The only option left for mankind is to increase the attention given to terrorism the world over because no nation will ever claim absolute freedom from the scourge- because the victims of September 11 attacks in US were from around the world. For us in Nigeria, we must also take steps to deal with the problems that are unique to us like the incessant ethno-religious and other sectarian crisis, Niger-Delta militants (kudos to the Yar'Adua Amnesty) programme; and the *Boko-Haram* uprising in the North-Eastern Nigeria among others.

The effort made here is to interrogate the phenomenon of sectarianism, terrorism and its impact on Socio-economic development of Nigeria. From the analysis so far, the conclusion here is that this crisis has impacted negatively on the socio-economic development of Nigeria. This is said to be manifesting through so many unresolved issues leading to all manner of conflicts by way of sectarian or ethno-religious conflicts witnessed in the country as shown in the paper.

Recommendations

Deriving from the fact that sectarianism and terrorism activities have negative implications on the socio-economic well-being of the Nigerian people through loss of human lives and properties as well as huge resources expended in managing the crises,

the following recommendations are made to tame the tide of sectarianism and terrorists activities in Nigeria. These are as follows:

- i. The Nigerian State under its leadership and political elites must create and continuously foster a climate of open dialogue and communication among the disparate elements and plural segments of the Nigerian society. This will imbue the country with the necessary sense of cohesion and integration, thus reducing acrimony, squabbles, tension, violent conflicts and ultimately end terrorism, which is almost consuming the country.
- ii. There is an urgent need for the initiation of bottom-top security approach anchored on local community intelligence. This approach to security makes every Nigerian, a security officer and will not only transcend the bounds of traditional security architecture, but complement it. This method will help check the rising cases of infiltration of communities and religious groups by people of questionable characters.
- iii. Transparency, probity and accountability in public governance process are irreducible minimum requirements for good governance and sound economic performance for improved citizens' living conditions, and this is highly recommended. This premised on the fact that a well enhanced citizenry, that is gainfully employed will not engage in terrorist activities. A hungry man they say is an angry man!
- iv. Sponsors and sources of funding for the *Boko-Haram* insurgency and other sectarian crisis should be identified and investigated and those culpable punished. It is hoped that curtailing the sources of funding sectarian crisis and terrorist activities will go a long way in reducing the rising wave of sectarianism and terrorism activities in Nigeria.
- v. The government should put machinery in place through a collaborative effort between national and state orientation agencies, local government areas, traditional rulers, youths, women and religious groups in carrying out campaigns in all parts of the country to entrench a sense of unity and patriotism. This will help to address the misconceptions about western education, government activities and other issues used by *Boko-Haram* terrorist group in convincing the youths to support them. Furthermore, it will also help to address the issue of school drop outs so that those with sectarian and terrorists tendencies will not seize the opportunity to recruit them.
- vi. The rising cases of poverty and unemployment should be urgently addressed. Policies aimed at employment generation and poverty reduction should be put in place by the various tiers of government. There should also be collaborations between government and the private sector, as well as efforts at revamping ailing firms and empowering youths and women through skills acquisition programmes and agricultural practices. These measures cannot be achieved

- without government addressing the issue of corruption in the governance process so as to improve the socio-economic well-being of the citizens.
- vii. Finally, the government of Nigeria should partner with the international community in addressing the issue of *Boko-Haram* insurgency and other sectarian crisis. Terrorism is a global phenomenon; therefore, it is advisable that it should also be addressed through global collaboration.

It is hoped that if these recommendations are carefully implemented, the efforts made here would have gone a long way in addressing the challenges of sectarianism, terrorism and attainment of socio-economic development that the nation so much desires.

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